(U) Topic

(S//REL TO USA, DEU) NSA's Counterterrorism (CT) Relationship with the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)

(U) Potential Landmines

- (TS//SI//NF) The Germans may bring up the subject of SKYPE. NSA's response has been that it has had some success working SKYPE via tailored access at the end point by gaining access to one or more of the computers involved in the session. When Hr. Klaus-Fritsche (State Secretary, Germany Ministry of Interior) sought NSA's assistance with intercepting SKYPE transmissions during a 10 January 2012 meeting with DIRNSA, DIRNSA suggested the DNI Representative Berlin take the lead in arranging an exchange to include CIA, FBI and NSA. Should the partner raise this issue again, recommend that NSA once again redirects them to FBI and CIA.
- (S//NF) The Germans have previously approached NSA about using information derived from SIGINT in open court. CT is concerned that exposing SIGINT capabilities in German court threatens the ability to maintain the desired and planned for level of SIGINT cooperation.

(U) Talking Points

(U) Director's Talking Points

- (S//REL TO USA, DEU) Ensure that the Germans understand the importance that NSA places on its robust CT sharing relationship with the BND and the BfV, as well as NSA's desire to continue to move forward in the ongoing analytic and technical exchanges.
- (S//REL TO USA, DEU) Acknowledge that NSA/CT now has a formal relationship with the BfV (approved 20 March 2013). CT expects to receive value from a closer NSA/BND/BfV partnership because it will generate a greater synergy to more effectively counter terrorist threats. CT is pleased that BND is taking a leadership role in implementing technical solutions when partnering with the BfV, and we expect this to continue.

(U) SIGINT Director's Talking Points


 (S//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) Discuss and emphasize NSA's commitment to continuing and increasing the exchange on discovery methodologies. The topic

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and importance of using behavior detection techniques to identify unknown extremists was discussed several times in 2012 with both BND and BfV and CT sees great value in working closely with both German partners on these analytic tradecraft methodologies. The next meeting to further discuss behavior detection is scheduled for 10-11 April in Bad Aibling with the BND and BfV. These sessions are specifically focused on understanding, creating, and implementing discovery capabilities through XKEYSCORE. Ultimately, CT's goal is to gain benefit by collaborating on German extremists targets once the BfV has, and is optimally using, XKEYSCORE.



(U) Background

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's CT collaborates with the BND (bilaterally and multilaterally) and with the BfV (bilaterally) on a variety of CT issues and targets. Engagement in the multilateral realm is via the SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) CT coalition (SISECT). NSA CT exchanges information with the BND and the BfV on the following topics:



(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) CT also provides information to the BND on the following topics:



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(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) The primary stakeholders for CT exchanges with the Germans are the European Cryptologic Center (ECC) and the S2I Deployed Analyst (DA) in Berlin. NSA's CT meets with the BND and BfV quarterly and with the BND every six months at SISECT. The latest analytic exchange was on 4-5 December 2012 in Berlin. Although previous discussions focused on traveling to Germany and Central Asia, this latest exchange focused heavily on North African CT topics, including key presentations from both sides on . CT European targets remain the focus of the relationship with BfV; however, it is likely that CT North African targets will have an expanded focus with BND and BfV as North Africa continues to serve as a magnet for from Europe. In addition, future discussions will likely expand to Europeans traveling to and the threat they may pose upon return to Europe.



(TS//SI//NF) In addition, SSG has been working with the BND and BfV on collection as well as target discovery and development tradecraft. In October 2011, SSG partnered with SUSLAG and BND to conduct a demonstration of XKEYSCORE to the BfV using BfV domestic warranted collection. The BND XKEYSCORE system successfully processed DSL wiretap collection belonging to a German domestic CT target. As a result of this demonstration, the BfV Vice President formally requested the XKEYSCORE software from DIRNSA to further enable the BfV to achieve its mission goal of countering terrorist activities in Germany. By enhancing BfV's Internet analytic capabilities through the provision of XKEYSCORE, NSA will enable Germany to provide unique contributions in the form of collection, data summaries, and/or finished intelligence to the high-priority NSA CT mission. The SPF approving the provision of XKEYSCORE to the BfV was approved on 25 March 2013. The Terms of Reference related to this effort is currently with the Germans for signature, which is expected in mid-April.

(U) Date of Material

(U) 8 April 2013

(U) POCs

(U) Originator

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